

teorema

Vol. XXXIII/1, 2014, pp. 5-17

ISSN: 0210-1602

[BIBLID 0210-1602 (2014) 33:1; pp. 5-17]

Inattention and the Speckled Hen

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RESUMEN

Fred Dretske y Bence Nanay han argumentado que si S ve una colección de objetos, entonces si S está lo suficientemente cerca de la colección de manera que distinga a cada uno de sus miembros, S ve a cada uno de sus miembros. Michael Tye no está de acuerdo con esto. Su artículo apela a casos de ceguera *inatencional* y a la distinción entre atención focal y atención visual para apoyar la posición de Tye sobre el ver colecciones sin negar la explicación de Dretske de la ceguera al cambio. Se concluye que si S ve la colección de cerca o a cierta distancia, S puede ver todos los objetos de la colección sin ver a cada uno de los miembros.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *experiencia visual, atención, atención visual, ceguera inatencional, ceguera al cambio, Fred Dretske, Michael Tye.*

ABSTRACT

Fred Dretske and Bence Nanay have argued that if S sees a collection of objects, then if S is close enough to the collection to distinguish each of its members, S sees each member. Michael Tye disagrees. This paper appeals to instances of *inattentional* blindness and the distinction between focal attention and visual attention to support Tye's view of seeing collections without denying Dretske's account of change blindness. It is concluded that whether S views the collection from up close or from a distance, S can see all of the objects in the collection without seeing each member.

KEYWORDS: *Visual Experience; Attention; Visual Attention; Inattentional Blindness; Change Blindness; Fred Dretske; Michael Tye.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Take a single glance¹ at this “crowd of balls”:




Figure 1

I take it you've seen that all the 'balls' are grey. Have you *thereby* seen every ball in the crowd? According to Fred Dretske (2010) and Bence Nanay (2009), you have. According to Michael Tye (2009, 2010a), you have not. That is, according to Tye, you have not *thereby* seen every ball in the crowd; it's possible to see the crowd in a glance without seeing every ball in it.

All three authors are concerned to explain the following pair of facts that sometimes hold when you're looking at a collection with n-many members:

- (1) You see all the members of the collection.
- (2) You do not see the collection as having n-many members.

That is, although you may see the crowd and all the balls, you need not thereby see the crowd as having, say, 54 members. The discussants disagree over which cases, if any, also ground the truth of 3.

- (3) You see every member of the collection.

Tye proposes that 1 and 2 may hold of the same collection because 1 does not entail 3; where 3 is false, you don't see the collection as having 54 members because you don't see every member of the collection.

According to Dretske, if you're looking at a collection of thirteen balls — call it "collection A" — and you can see that all the balls in the crowd are grey, "[y]ou must, therefore, see all thirteen balls in collection A." [Dretske (2010), p. 62] On Dretske's view, 1 does entail 3. Both 1 and 2 may hold, however, because 3 does not entail the negation of 2: rather, one can see, for instance, that each ball in the collection is grey without seeing that there are 13 grey balls in the collection. [(Ibid), p. 61]

According to Nanay, both Dretske and Tye are right. Imagine looking at a flock of geese from a distance. You can see distinct little dots making up the flock, but you can't keep distinct track of them all. In this case, says Nanay, one can see all the geese without seeing each individual goose. If the flock is closer,

however, close enough that you *can* “attend to any of the individual geese and track it for a longish time”, then Nanay says we should agree with Dretske: you see all of them and you see each of them” [Nanay (2009), pp. 501-2].

In fact, Dretske accepts that there are exceptions to the inference from 1 to 3 along the same lines. He acknowledges that if one is looking at a herd of cows from a long distance, one can see the herd and see that the herd is in Pleasant Pasture without seeing Bessie The Cow and without seeing that Bessie is in Pleasant Pasture [Dretske (2010), p. 63].

I take it that Dretske and Nanay agree, then: one may see a collection without seeing each of its members from a distance, but when the collection is near enough that *one could distinguish its members individually*, then if one sees the collection, one sees each member as well. Tye disagrees: one need not be far away to see all the members without seeing each member individually. His view is that S sees X if S *could attend to X*, but S could see a collection of which X is a member without thereby being able to attend to X.

This paper claims that S’s *in fact* distinguishing X from the rest of the visual scene is a necessary prerequisite for the possibility of S’s attending to X. That is, if it’s true that S *could attend to X*, it must be true that S in fact distinguished X from the visual scene; and, if S in fact does not distinguish X from the rest of the scene, then S cannot attend to X. The modal strength of Tye’s “could” in “S could attend to X”, then, is fixed by S’s visually distinguishing X. Compare this to Dretske’s and Nanay’s view, which says that S sees X if S *could distinguish X* from the rest of the visual scene. In adjudicating the disagreement at hand, then, we should ask which of these is true:

1. S sees X just in case S *could* visually distinguish X; or
2. S sees X just in case S *in fact* distinguishes X and thus could attend to X.

I argue for the latter. Before doing so, let me clarify the crucial distinction.

II. VISUAL ATTENTION AND FOCAL ATTENTION

The distinction between *attending to X* and *visually distinguishing X* may be unclear or seem *ad hoc*. Indeed, the word “attention” is used to refer to both. Above, for instance, Nanay’s reference to “attending to” and “tracking” individual geese in a distant flock plausibly refers to visually distinguishing each goose (so that visual tracking may proceed). Similarly, we shall see that both Tye and Dretske use the word for both distinguishing and attending. There are good reasons to think, however, that these two are distinct mental processes. In its most common use, “attention” refers to a generalized *focusing* or *concentration* of one’s conscious experience. It is in this

sense that your attention is now occupied with reading this page. Call this “focal attention”. In the cognitive science of vision, there is a narrower, technical sense of “attention”: visual processing prerequisite for encoding visual information.² Visual attention is the directedness of the visual system. If I am lost in thought as I drive to work, my focal attention may be on my plans for the day, but my visual attention is directed at the road before me — if it weren’t, I would crash. I may visually attend to a curve in the road or a jet flying far overhead without in fact consciously (i.e. focally) attending to either. In distinguishing targets from the background, visual attention makes objects available to focal attention, such that they *may be* focally attended to — though they need not be.

Given the ambiguity in “attention”, I hope you can see the potential for confusion in the present discussion. There is a kind of attention, focal attention, that is not necessary for seeing; and, there is a kind that is more plausibly necessary for seeing, visual attention. If “attention” refers to the first kind, Dretske and Nanay are right that S may see X even if S doesn’t in fact attend to X. But this is far less plausible if it refers to the second sense. Thus, while it doesn’t reveal much to observe that one may *focally* attend to the collection without attending to each of its members, it is exactly to the point to show — as I attempt to do below — that one may *visually* attend to the collection without so attending to each of its members.

Indeed, given the importance of this distinction for this discussion, it may appear that I’m begging the question against Dretske or that I’m misunderstanding Tye in the argument that follows. Let me clear away this appearance. First, since I claim that visual attention is prerequisite for seeing, if S does not distinguish X from the scene, then S does not see X. Since visual attention is, in part, the cognitive process that distinguishes a target from the visual field, we may say: if S does not visually attend to X, S does not see X. Dretske seems to argue the contrary: “what requires attention...is perception *of the fact* that there is an x in location L, *not* a perception of the x (*object*) in L” [Dretske (2004), p. 16, endnote 9, emphasis in original]. Unlike facts, we can see objects without paying attention to them. Dretske uses an example in which he scans his shelves for a particular book: “I may, in this process, *see* hundreds, even thousands, of books. I notice, I pay attention to, only one or two...” [Dretske (Ibid.) p. 12, emphasis added]. He may not see (the fact) that Plato’s *Symposium* is on his shelf, but he still sees the book (the object) there on the shelf. On the basis of these and other intuitive examples, Dretske concludes that one *may*, in fact, see X without attending to it. Clearly, however, Dretske is not talking about *visual* attention; he is talking about focal attention. In his example, his *focal attention* is on the task of finding a specific book, even while his visual attention falls briefly on hundreds, even thousands, of other books. Dretske rightly argues that focal attention is unnecessary for seeing, then, but he doesn’t have an argument (yet, anyway) to the

conclusion that *visual* attention is unnecessary for seeing. Thus, in arguing below that if S does not visually attend to X, then S does not see X, I am not failing to observe Dretske's arguments to the contrary.

Second, in a confusion of terminology similar to that marked above, one may note that Tye seems to disagree with what I've been saying about visual attention. Tye says, for example, that "...one fails to see a thing if one cannot attend to it. Still, one can see a thing if one does not attend to it" [Tye (2010b), p. 426]. All Tye requires is that one *could* attend to it, and since I say it is necessary for S to actually visually attend to X in order to see it, it may seem that Tye and I disagree. But if we do, then many of Tye's other claims become puzzling. For instance, Tye says

What if I decide to focus on a particular unmarked-out region of the tree trunk that (as it happens) is filled by a perfectly camouflaged moth? Still, in my view, I do not see the moth; for the moth is not differentiated in the phenomenology of my experience [Tye (Ibid.), p. 433, endnote 3].

If Tye is to see the moth, it is necessary for it to be visually differentiated in his experience.³ Since visual discrimination is a sub-process of visual attention, it looks as though Tye in fact does agree with me about the necessity of attention for seeing.

Although Tye generally prefers to use "attention" to refer to *focal attention*, he does acknowledge the distinction I have drawn on above. In regard to his remarks to the effect that attending is not necessary for seeing, he clarifies that "'focal attention' is just attention, as I have been concerned with it centrally in this essay" [(Ibid), p. 431]. Focal attention is to be distinguished from what Tye calls "diffuse attention". In diffuse attention, "there is a selection process at work that...makes [what is selected] available for further processing" [Ibid.]. This is what I have called "visual attention".⁴ Further, he accepts that "diffuse attention" is necessary for seeing: "There is, then, a usage of the term 'attention' under which we really do not see things unless we attend to them" [Ibid.]. Tye accepts, then, that it is indeed necessary for S to *visually attend* to X if S is to see X; and, this is consistent with his claim that S sees X if S *can* attend to X, since "attend" in the second claim refers to *focal attention*. I am proposing, again, that S's visually attending to X makes it the case that S *could* focally attend to X, and so on Tye's view, S would thus see X if S visually attends to it.

With this distinction in hand, then, I hope the value of the present discussion is clear. With respect to crowds of balls, we may presume that if one sees the crowd, then one *could* visually attend to each member, but it need not be that one *does in fact* attend to each member. Thus, if it's possible to see the collection without seeing each member, this suggests that in fact visually attending to X is, *contra* Dretske and Nanay, necessary for seeing X.

Since one could have visually attended to each member but simply did not, it is not enough that S *could* visually attend to X; it must be that S does distinguish X from the visual field.

Again, I will argue that one may indeed see the collection without seeing each of its members. I take as grounds for my argument the claim that S may, in a glance, distinguish an X in the visual field without thereby distinguishing every visible part of X contained in the space X occupies, and in such a case, S will not meet our usual standards for having seen each of X's parts. It is thus possible for S to visually distinguish a collection of balls without distinguishing every ball within the space of the collection. In support of this claim, I offer, first, evidence from inattentive blindness and, second, an intuitive case.

III. SEEING X WITHOUT SEEING X'S PARTS

First, I propose that if one experiences inattentive blindness while looking at a collection, then with respect to the inference from 1 to 3, one's visual experience is no different from that in Nanay's distant flock of geese or in Dretske's distant herd of cows. No matter the distance, one can see all the members of a collection without seeing every member individually. More generally, one may see X without thereby seeing every visible thing within the space that X occupies. Consider the registered trademark of Federal Express:



Figure 2

You see the image. You see all of it. There is a "hidden arrow" within the space the image occupies; do you see it? According to Dretske and Nanay, you do. After all, you see all the parts of the image, and you *could* distinguish the hidden arrow from its background, given where your eyes are directed and the environment actually before you.

But you don't see the arrow (or, at least some of you don't see it). The arrow is not part of your visual experience. Why not? The most plausible explanation is that it is not enough simply that you *could* distinguish the arrow from the rest of the scene or that the arrow is an unconcealed part of something you have in fact visually distinguished. If either of those were true, you would see the arrow. Rather, you (or your visual system) must *in fact* distinguish the arrow from the rest of the visual scene. Since you do not, in fact, distinguish the

arrow from the rest of the image, you don't see it. Your visual inattention to the relevant parts of the image renders you blind to the arrow. That's why it's called inattention blindness.⁵ There's no doubt that you *could* see the arrow, given what else you see, but it doesn't follow that you do see it.

Second, take a glance at the collection of 'balls' in figure 3 (on the next page). Are there any dark purple balls in the collection? If you can answer this correctly ("no"), you can do so, I presume, on the basis of your visual experience of the collection. Your experience included grounds for answering at least some questions about the collection that you wouldn't have been able to answer had you not had the experience. Had you not experienced the collection, you might nonetheless have been able to answer *some* questions about it ("Is it a collection?", "Does it occupy space?"), but you wouldn't have been in a position to say whether it has any dark purple members. On the other hand, were you unable to answer every single non-trivial question about what the collection looks like just after ostensibly seeing it, this would be reason to doubt that you had visually experienced the collection.

Was each member of the collection also in (or represented in) your visual experience? If so, then just as it did for the collection, your experience should give you grounds to answer some non-trivial questions about each member. If there's some member about which you can't answer any such questions, that's *prima facie* reason to think you didn't visually experience it. I won't try to show that there's some member about whose appearance you know nothing non-trivial,⁶ but I hope the following questions are suggestive.

- Is each ball uniformly shaded throughout?
- Is there a ball with a pale yellow interior and a pink outline?
- Is there a ball with a periwinkle interior and a turquoise outline?

Given the above points, if you don't know the answer to one of these questions, it suggests that your visual experience of the collection was not also an experience of each and every member of the collection. You can see all the balls without seeing each of them. And, again, this is because it is not enough for S to see X that S could visually attend to X; it must be that S does visually distinguish X.




Figure 3

If we adopt the position that seeing *X* requires more than the possibility of visually distinguishing *X*, it is easy to make sense of these cases. First, note that distinguishing visual objects (including collections of objects) from a visual background occurs at an object's borders, so to speak. If the borders are brought into relief, the object or collection is visually distinguished. In the case of a collection of balls, the collection may be distinguished from its background without distinguishing any of the balls toward the center of the collection from their backgrounds. You distinguish the letters in the Federal Express trademark from the white background by attending to the letters' borders; you can do this — you can even do it for all the letters' borders at once — without distinguishing the space between the 'E' and the 'x' as a distinct visual object. (See the 'hidden arrow' filled in below.) Similarly, you can distinguish all of the collection of pale balls from its background without so distinguishing the periwinkle ball with the turquoise outline.



Figure 4

Second, what one visually attends to in a scene is as contingent and quirky as intentional looking. Imagine approaching a mural painted across 50 feet of wall. From a distance sufficient to permit you to see the mural in its entirety, you can't make out much detail. As you come nearer, you're so close that you need to move your head to one side or the other to bring it all within your visual field. You look at the part of the wall to the left; your companion might look to the right. We acknowledge that in another instance, you might look to the right while your companion looks to the left; or you might have both looked in the same direction. *That you are looking at the mural* doesn't fully determine which part of the mural falls within a given glance. You might be seeing this part or that part. That intentional looking is thus independent of what is available to look at is hardly worth stating. But the same goes for the relationship between what is available to be distinguished from the visual field and what one does, in fact, distinguish from the visual field. As your gaze sweeps across the wall, your visual attention might 'catch on' a patch of blue while your companion might pick out a patch of red. In another case, it might be reversed, or you might both distinguish the blue patch from the rest of the field. You both see the mural, but this fact doesn't make it the case that you both visually attend to the very same part of

the mural. Similarly, you might glance at the ‘balls’ in figure 1 and visually distinguish balls 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 28, 29... while a friend might distinguish 5, 6, 7, 17, 18, 19... in her glance at the collection. There’s no reason to deny that what you could visually distinguish is similarly quirky.

Just as looking at a scene need not fully determine which part of the scene one sees, distinguishing X from the visual scene need not fully determine which part(s) of X one distinguishes — that is, seeing X does not entail that one has seen every part of X. This perhaps seems intuitive, but it also seems clear how Dretske would object to what I’ve said. He’d agree that one may be unable to answer non-trivial questions about the arrow and the pink and turquoise ball, but he would deny that this tells us anything about what one sees. That is, he would say here something similar to what he has said about change blindness. We should thus reckon with his remarks on change blindness.

IV. DRETSKE’S ACCOUNT OF CHANGE BLINDNESS

In experiments demonstrating change blindness, subjects report that they have not detected a difference between two scenes presented sequentially. Subjects may be shown, for example, two crowds of grey balls, the first one with 43 balls and the second with 44. When asked, subjects will report that they see no difference between the two crowds. Of course, a subject may see that ball 44 in the second crowd is off to the right if it is pointed out to her, and she may even find the difference conspicuous once it is pointed out. The apparent failure to see the difference, even though it is right in front of one’s face, and even though it may appear obvious after it has been pointed out has been called “change blindness”. Roughly, Dretske’s view is that “change blindness” is a misnomer — the observed effects are evidence of what subjects *know*, not of what they *see*.

First, Dretske distinguishes between a change and a difference. Think of two photos taken in quick succession. The first depicts one side of a tall office building in Manhattan taken from outside at night; 43 of the windows in the photo are illuminated from within. The second depicts the same building from the same angle at about the same time, but with 44 illuminated windows. From one photo to the next, there is a difference, and one may not notice this difference while looking at the photos later. But while looking through the camera at the building at night, one may still have noticed the *change* in the scene — the 44th light coming on. On the basis of this distinction, Dretske points out that what is often called a blindness to change is in fact about noticing a difference in two scenes. It is not a failure to notice the occurrence of a change that calls for explanation; rather, it is a failure to notice a difference between two scenes.

Second, Dretske challenges the presumption that what best explains subjects' responses is a failure to see the additional ball in the second crowd or the additional light in the second photo. Here, his distinction between seeing an object and seeing a fact, as discussed above, comes back into play. Does one fail to see the 44th illuminated window (an object) in the second photo, or does one fail to see (the fact) that there is one more illuminated window in the second photo? Dretske argues that if it is the second, this does not tell us that subjects fail to *see* the 44th light; it tells us only that subjects do not *know* that the 44 illuminated windows in the second photo are one more than the 43 illuminated windows in the first photo. One may see all 44 illuminated windows, then, without seeing that the two photos depict different scenes.

Further, given that subjects are looking at each crowd of balls or each photo in good light, that their visual systems are functioning properly, etc., it is more plausible to assume that subjects see the extra ball in the second crowd and the extra light in the second photo than to assume that they do not. Thus, it is more plausible to assume that what accounts for their reports of 'blindness' to differences is in fact a failure of knowledge about differences.

But this is not to say that anytime one sees a crowd of balls or a photo of an office building, one thereby sees each ball in the crowd and each visible object in the photo. Dretske's account of change blindness need not appeal to any necessary condition on seeing objects. Rather, Dretske's account simply points out that, first, change blindness results offer us an interpretive choice: either subjects with normal visual capacities are *blind* to differences or they are ignorant of them. And, second, it strains our understanding of vision less to accept the latter. Where those who have interpreted experimental results on change blindness have gone wrong is in failing to appreciate that there was a choice to be made. Thus Dretske asks:

What, then, can be inferred from the fact that a person believes she does not see a difference? [...] For most values of *x*, *S*'s believing she does not see *x* is compatible with *S* seeing *x* [Dretske (2004), p.8].

The canonical interpretations of change blindness results failed to appreciate this compatibility. In pointing it out, Dretske need not appeal to any necessary condition on seeing; he need only deny a necessary condition. That is, he need only deny that *S*'s believing she sees *X* is necessary for her seeing *X*.

Above, we saw Dretske argue that one may see, for example, the 44th ball in the second crowd without attending to the fact that, thanks to the 44th ball, the second crowd of balls differs from the first. He wanted to establish that one may see the ball without believing that it underwrites a difference between the two crowds and thus that one may report that one sees no difference in the crowds even though one has seen all the balls in each crowd.

Given the distinction between visual attention and focal attention, Dretske may (and should) accept that one may see the ball without *focally* attending to it, even if one does indeed *visually* attend to it. On the account I am here promoting, visually attending to X is necessary for seeing X, but focally attending to X is not. Further, since visual attention does not always send information ‘upstream’ to focal attention, it is possible to visually attend to X without attending to the fact that one is visually attending to X. That is, visually attending to X and believing that one does not see X are compatible. Thus, one may accept the necessary condition on seeing proposed here without rejecting Dretske’s interpretation of change blindness results.

Where Dretske and I disagree is in the somewhat orthogonal issue of what’s involved in seeing collections. Dretske claims that if S sees that all the balls in the collection are grey, then S sees each ball in the collection. He believes that seeing each of the balls is necessary for seeing that all the balls are grey. As part of his defense, Dretske appeals to his discussion of change blindness, reminding us that one may see each of the balls in the collection without knowing it. But we can acknowledge this possibility, of course, without accepting that, *necessarily*, every time S sees a collection and believes she hasn’t seen each member, S has in fact seen each member. It remains possible that S believes she has not in fact seen each member of the collection *and she is right to believe as much*. In support of this view, I suggested above that that if one had glanced at figure 3 but then didn’t know whether the figure included a pink and turquoise ball, this was reason to believe that one hadn’t seen the pink and turquoise ball in their glance. In light of Dretske’s claims about change blindness, we might expect him to respond that one’s failure to have certain beliefs about the pink and turquoise ball — one’s failure to see certain *facts* about the ball — is no evidence that one didn’t see the ball. But this is implausible. We may grant that S may see X without knowing it, without going so far as to accept that in all cases, S’s ignorance of X’s appearance offers no evidence as to whether S saw X or not.

Imagine that you and I agree to call the pink and turquoise ball “ball 7”; and, suppose I ask you to look at ball 7. If you tell me that you’ve just glanced at ball 7 (in good light, with working and normal visual apparatus) but you don’t know what colors it is, I have reason to doubt that you’ve seen it. We need not attempt a full explanation of what sort of evidence ignorance provides for inferring what one has seen; I take it that the cases at hand are clearly in contrast. In the case of the change from 43 to 44 lit windows, the abundance of similar information in the scenes and the relatively small change between them make it intuitive that one might fail to see the fact of their difference. We’re all aware of how unreliable we are in recovering information of such precision from quick visual experiences, and we are all aware of how we would go about distinguishing the two experiences if we had to: we’d take the time to count the lit windows in each. In the case of the

single pink and turquoise ball, we need no such time. If one sees the ball in good light and one can see the colors pink and turquoise, one sees *that* the ball is pink and turquoise. In such cases, then, ignorance of the fact that the ball is pink and turquoise really is evidence that one hasn't seen the ball. Thus, if one has seen the collection and doesn't know that it includes a pink and turquoise ball, there is good reason to think one has seen the collection but not each of its members.

V. CONCLUSION

The distinction between focal and visual attention may now help us to better understand change blindness, inattention blindness, and the debate over how collections are seen. Dretske's account of change blindness results is plausible in part because the attention blamed for the 'blindness' is focal attention. If subjects don't focus on the difference, they won't report having seen it. Pointing out that one may see X without being aware that one has seen X, then, undermines the claim that subjects are *blind* to differences. Not all inattention blindness, however, is due to failures in focal attention. One may fail to report seeing the arrow in the FedEx logo because one fails to focus on it, but, as Dretske points out, this doesn't tell us for certain whether one sees the arrow or not. One may see the arrow and not know it because one has not focused on it, but, contrary to Dretske's view, this is not the only possibility. Rather, one may also claim not to see the arrow because one genuinely fails to see it; and, this may be because one fails to distinguish it from the rest of the visual field, i.e. one fails to visually attend to it. Just as one might scan a tree trunk up and down without distinguishing the perfectly camouflaged moth thereon, one might look over the FedEx trademark left and right without distinguishing the 'hidden' arrow as a visual object. In this case, inattention blindness is not due to a failure of focal attention but of visual attention. Even if one focuses on the parts of the image making up the arrow, one's visual system may still fail to select it as a visual object. Thus, while Dretske may be right that change blindness is best understood as difference ignorance, inattention blindness is at least sometimes a genuine failure to see. Similarly, one may see a collection of balls and see that it is a collection of grey balls without visually discriminating each ball. It does not follow from the fact that one sees that all the balls are grey that one has seen that every ball is grey.

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NOTES

¹ Recall that the original puzzle involves seeing the speckled hen in a single glance. Compare Tye (2009), p. 260.

² See, for instance, Pylyshyn (2003), pp. 88-9; 150-200, and Posner (1980), p. 4.

³ See also "...even if I can't identify a thing, if I am conscious of it then it must be marked out or differentiated in the phenomenology of my experience" [Tye (Ibid., p. 413)].

⁴ Thus, again, Nanay's remarks about selecting and tracking distant geese plausibly concern visual attention rather than focal attention.

⁵ See Mack and Rock (1998) for the canonical discussion.

⁶ Nor do I need to. It's consistent with my view, of course, that someone *may* see the collection and every one of its members. My contention is only that one *may also* see the collection without seeing each of its members. It is inconsistent with my view, then, only that it is *impossible* to see the collection without seeing each of its members.

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