

# FRANCISCO SUÁREZ ON PAIN AND TOUCH\*

DANIEL HEIDER

Universidad del Sur de Bohemia, České Budějovice, (República Checa)

**ABSTRACT:** In the study the author aims at two main things. First, he points out an (at least) potential doctrinal incoherence in Suárez's statements concerning the issue of the proper sensible object of touch. While in the context of his treatment of the sense of touch in *DA VII*, 13-14 Suárez restricts the total object of touch to external (tangent) qualities, in *DA XI*, 2, when treating the issue of emotions, the Jesuit includes also the *qualitas dolorifera*, i.e., a quality inherent in the percipient's body. The author states that Suárez's inconsistency is more urgent if his formulations are compared with those of Francisco de Oviedo. Second, the author indicates that Suárez's «mixed view of pain», combining both the perceptual and the affective aspects in the single experience of pain, is a kind of theory that can be regarded as an up-to-date position even in the contemporary debate among analytic philosophers.

**KEY WORDS:** pain; touch; emotion; exteroception; interoception; analytic philosophy.

## *Dolor y tacto en Francisco Suárez*

**RESUMEN:** Este trabajo tiene dos propósitos. Por un lado, el autor advierte de una (cuando menos) potencial incoherencia doctrinal en las afirmaciones de Suárez concernientes a la cuestión del sensible propio del tacto. Mientras que en el contexto de su tratamiento del tacto en *DA VII*, 13-14, Suárez restringe el objeto total del tacto a las cualidades (tangibles) externas, en *DA XI*, 2, al tratar de las emociones, el autor jesuita incluye también la *qualitas dolorifera*, i.e. una cualidad inherente al cuerpo de quien percibe. El autor sostiene que esta inconsistencia de Suárez es tanto más apremiante si se comparan sus formulaciones con las de Francisco de Oviedo. En segundo lugar, se indica que la «versión compuesta del dolor» que combina tanto aspectos perceptibles como afectivos en la experiencia unificada del dolor, es un tipo de teoría que podría considerarse como contemporánea en el debate actual entre filósofos analíticos.

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** dolor; tacto; emoción; exterocepción; propiocepción; filosofía analítica.

## INTRODUCTION

In his analysis of the proper sensible object of the sensory modality of touch in his *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis*, disputation VII, question 13, number 1, Francisco Suárez introduces the following brief, *prima facie* unequivocal, formulation: «Obiectum vero tactus sunt qualitates primae, et aliae tangibiles, quae ex his dimanant, ut durities, etc., de quibus in 2 De generatione [d. 4, q. 1] dictum est.»<sup>1</sup> In this first question of the fourth disputation of his *Commentary on Generation and Corruption*, Suárez states that next to the primary qualities, i.e., the hot, the cold, the dry and the moist, there

---

\* This study is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation as the project GA ČR 14-37038G «Between Renaissance and Baroque: Philosophy and Knowledge in the Czech Lands within the Wider European Context».

<sup>1</sup> SUÁREZ, F., *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros De anima*, Edición crítica por Salvador Castellote, Tomo 2, Editorial Labor, Madrid, 1981, disp. VII, q. 13, n. 1, p. 72 (further only: *DA VII*, 13, 1, 72).

are five pairs of non-basic tactile qualities – all constituting binary oppositions – which constitute the (total) proper sensible object of touch. They are the heavy/the lightweight, the hard/the soft, the viscous/the brittle, the rough/the smooth, and the coarse/the fine. They all are external secondary qualities, which, except for the first pair, are produced by the blending of the primary qualities<sup>2</sup>. The first task of my paper is to raise the following exegetical question in respect to Suárez's *DA*: Is it true that for him only these *external* tactile qualities constitute the total proper sensible of touch and the experience of pain, in analogy to Aquinas' claim in *Summa theologiae*<sup>3</sup>, is thus relegated only to the sensory appetite, or does the *Doctor Eximius*, in a linkup to Avicenna and the medical and Augustinian tradition, represented by the names of Pietro d'Abano (1250-1316) and Peter John Olivi (1248-1298)<sup>4</sup>, extend the scope of the proper sensible objects of touch by including in it also qualities such as the painful bodily states that we today call «introceptive» qualities? To put it tersely, is pain (*dolor*) a sensible object perceivable by the sense of touch, or a feeling and an emotion?

<sup>2</sup> SUÁREZ, F., *Thesaurus doctrinae circa libros Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione*, edición inédita, Traditus per reverendum Patrem Franciscum Suarez, Anno Domini 1775, 24ff., disp. IV, q. 1 (further only: *DGC* IV, 1, 24ff.), <http://www.salvadorcastellote.com/degetc2.pdf> [accessed 15 December 2016]

<sup>3</sup> «[...] ita etiam ad dolorem duo requiruntur, scilicet coniunctio alicuius mali... et perceptio huiusmodi coniunctionis. Quidquid autem coniungitur, si non habeat, respectu eius cui coniungitur, rationem boni vel mali, non potest causare delectationem vel dolorem. Ex quo patet quod aliquid sub ratione boni vel mali, est obiectum delectationis et doloris. Bonum autem et malum, in quantum huiusmodi, sunt obiecta appetitus. Unde patet quod delectatio et dolor ad appetitum pertinent [...] Cum igitur delectatio et dolor praesupponant in eodem subiecto sensum vel apprehensionem aliquam, manifestum est quod dolor, sicut et delectatio, est in appetitu intellectivo vel sensitivo. Omnis autem motus appetitus sensitivi dicitur passio [...] Unde dolor, secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo, propriissime dicitur passio animae [...]», Sancti THOMAE DE AQUINO, *Summa Theologiae* 1.2, ed. Leonina, Roma, 1891, q. 35, a. 1, 240.

<sup>4</sup> FOR PIETRO D'ABANO'S extension of the *external* proper sensibles of *dolor* see his *Conciliator differentiarum quae inter philosophos et medicos versantur*, Editrice Antenore, Padova, 1985 (reprint of the 1565 edition, Venice), differentia LXXVII: «Utrum dolor sentiatur, nec ne», f. 117<sup>va</sup>: «Rursus dictum est antea per Avicennam quod dolor sit contrarium impressorem repente sentire. Adhuc illud, quod est signum, sentiatur [...] Amplius sciendum quod Aristoteles ponit ibidem dolorem fore unum tactus sensibilibus inquiens». For Olivi's enlargement of the scope of touch by referring to various inner states of the body such as feverish heats or swellings see Petr. John OLIVI, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, vol. II, Collegium S. Bonaventurae, Quaracchi 1924, q. LXI, 574. For both authors see also YRJÖNSSURI, M., «Perceiving One's Own Body»: KNUUTTILA, S., KÄRKKÄINEN, P. (eds.), *Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, Springer, Dordrecht, 2008, 101-116, esp. 105-6; YRJÖNSSURI, M., «Types of self-awareness in medieval thought»: HIRVONEN, VESA, HOLOPAINEN, T., TUOMINEN, M. (eds.), *Mind and modality: Studies in the history of philosophy in honour of Simo Knuuttila*, Brill, Leiden, 2006, 153-169, esp. 158-161; TOIVANEN, J., «Perceptual Self-Awareness in Seneca, Augustine, and Olivi»: *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 51, no. 3, 2013, 355-382, esp. 372-3. For the view that physical pain is sensed directly in Avicenna, Aquinas, d'Abano and Olivi see KNUUTTILA, S., «Pain»: Lagerlund, Henrik (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, Springer, Dordrecht, 2011, 909-910.

This doctrinal split associated with the different replies to the issue is far from restricted to the medieval and post-medieval scholastic debate. In the recent scholarship the core of the philosophical controversy about the (paradoxical) nature of pain oscillates between two main positions that bear a striking resemblance to the scholastic counterparts. While one view largely focuses on the objective aspects of pain, the other underscores the subjective elements in our experience of pain. The former understands pain mainly as an attribute of a physical object, commonly identified with the tissue damage of a part of our body. Accordingly, pain is tightly associated with the physical damage objectively located in a bodily part. Thus pain is something that can be perceived in the same way as the sensibles of the other sense modalities, such as a red colour. This perceptualist concept is contrasted with the second approach, which underlines the subjective and the non-perceptual aspects inherent in our experience of corporeal pain<sup>5</sup>. In this approach, which is more in line with the contemporary scientific approach, our pain experience is, phenomenologically speaking, of much richer composition than the advocates of the purely perceptualist view are prepared and willing to concede. Far more than an object or a cause, «being in pain» is a multidimensional matter involving evaluative, affective, emotional, motivational and imperative elements<sup>6</sup>.

In my paper I will proceed in five steps. In the first one I will present Suárez's answer to the issue what it is like to touch (feel), as expounded in *DA VII, 13 Utrum obiecta gustus et tactus immutent intentionaliter has potentia vel solum realiter*. In this question Suárez states that touch cannot perceive the sensibles inherent in the sense organ but only those that are tangent (*contiguus*) to its organ. Surely, this conclusion can be regarded as compatible with the negative reply to the crucial question of our investigation, namely that pain as such cannot be perceived by the tactile power (assuming that pain is something inherent in the tactile organ). In the second part, against the background of Suárez's theory of emotions, I will claim that the statement about the non-perception of the inherent qualities corresponds to the position according to which *dolor* is to be formally conceived as an act of the sensory appetitive power. Third, I present Suárez's view of the specific «dolorogenic quality» (*qualitas dolorifera*), as it is expounded in *DA XI, 2 Quotnam sint et quales actus appetitus sensitivi*, and I will claim that his view of *qualitas dolorifera* is to be seen as a significant elaboration, if not revision, of

<sup>5</sup> David M. ARMSTRONG and George PITCHER are usually regarded as two of the foremost representatives of this perceptualist view of pain. For the perceptualist concept of pain in Armstrong see especially his *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, Humanities Press, New York, 1968. For the second author's theory see below.

<sup>6</sup> For these two basic popular approaches to pain see HARDCASTLE, V., «Perception of Pain», in: MATTHEN, M. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015, 530-541; AYDEDE, M., «Pain», *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2013 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/pain/> [accessed 15 December 2016]; GRAHEK, N., «Objective and subjective aspects of pain», in: *Philosophical Psychology*, vol. 4, no. 2, 1991, 249-265.

the stance taken in *DA VII*, 13. I will argue that with respect to Suárez's account of *dolor* in *DA XI*, 2, his view of the scope of touch's proper sensible object calls for an extension, at least of another object, which is the *qualitas dolorifera*. Fourth, I show that if Suárez's «non-inclusion» of the dolorogenic quality in the list of tactile objects is compared with the position of the post-Suarezian Jesuit Francisco de Oviedo (1602-1651), then *a fortiori* the Uncommon Doctor can be regarded as verging on a doctrinal inconsistency. In the last section – where the second goal of my paper is to be carried out – I will situate Suárez's view of pain in the context of the recent debate about the nature and status of corporeal pain. I will espouse the view that, in its essential features, Suárez's «mixed account of pain» is to be regarded as similar to the theory advocated by one of the foremost representatives of the contemporary discussion, namely Murat Aydede. At the same time I will argue that Suárez's tenet can be seen as a theory capable of sailing between the Scylla of the perceptualist theory and the Charybdis of the non-perceptualist view of pain.

#### 1. TOUCH DOES NOT PERCEIVE THE QUALITIES INHERENT IN ITS ORGAN

Before entering on Suárez's claim about the tactile imperceptibility of the qualities inherent in the tactile organ, I have to expound the Spanish Jesuit's doctrine of the character of the organ of *tactus*.

Unlike the topic of the gustatory organ, Suárez regards the question of the *sensorium* of touch as a more problematic issue. Historically speaking, this evaluation can be well understood against the background of the established tenets, which are mentioned by Suárez himself. He distinguishes four views. On the first view, famously advocated by Aristotle in his *On Sense and Sensible Objects*, the organ of *tactus* is the heart<sup>7</sup>. The organ is the heart while the other parts, i.e., above all the skin and the flesh, are its (intrinsic) medium. On the second tenet, the organ(s) are the nerves – as such not known by Aristotle<sup>8</sup> – abounding under the flesh and the skin that are spread all over the body. Strictly speaking, again, the flesh and the skin are not the organ(s) but only the medium of the tactile organ proper. According to the third position, the organ is only the skin. The skin is better tempered than the flesh and the nerves. It is not as hot as the flesh, which is too hot since it is too sanguine, and it is not as cold as the nerves, which are too cold because they are bloodless. Finally,

<sup>7</sup> ARISTOTLE, *On the Soul, Parva naturalia, On Breath*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2000, *On Sense and Sensible Objects*, II, 439a2-3, 229: «For this reason the sense organ of both taste and touch is near the heart».

<sup>8</sup> For Aristotle's unfamiliarity with nerves see HASSE, D. N., «Pietro d'Abano's "Conciliator" and the Theory of the Soul in Paris», in: AERTSEN, J., EMERY, K., SPEER, A. (eds.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie Und Theologie an der Universität von Paris Im Letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York 2001, 635-653, esp. 643.

according to the last opinion, defended by Suárez himself, the organ of touch is the flesh and the skin spread all over the whole body with the exceptions of the hard and earthy parts such as bones, hairs, etc.<sup>9</sup>

Leaving aside Suárez's partial arguments against the first two teachings, his main refutation is based on the premise that – like hearing, smell and taste (with the exception of sight) – touch does *not* require a medium for its proper operation. The organs of the auditive, olfactory, gustatory and tactile powers can be affected intentionally or, as the scholastics in general say, «spiritually» by means of the sensible species, even though their organs are at the same time affected materially or naturally. A smoky evaporation can attain the organ of smell; a local movement of vibrating air can reach the inner ear, the organ of hearing; a tasteable object can penetrate the flesh of the tongue up to the lingual nerves and a tactile quality can be contiguous to the organ of touch, and still all the perceptual acts of those external senses, based on intentional affection, can be elicited<sup>10</sup>.

Yet for Suárez, the statement about the compatibility of the *contiguitas* of the external sensibles with the perceptual act is far from being compatible with the *inherent* sensible qualities. When speaking about the quality of heat, Suárez makes clear that the sense of touch cannot perceive a sensible quality inherent in its organ, i.e., in the percipient's body<sup>11</sup>. He phrases four arguments for this proposition. The first one, which can be designated as an argument from «parity with the other senses», states that if it holds that the other senses cannot perceive the qualities inherent in the organs, then neither can the sense of touch. Second, if touch perceived the inherent qualities, it would have to perceive them ceaselessly. However, this continuous perception is at odds with our (dynamic) experience. Third, *tactus* often perceives greater heat than the heat inhering in our hand. This greater heat is the heat of a fire, rather than heat inherent in its sense organ. If we bring our hand to a fire, we quickly feel its heat. It would be wrong to say that we perceive the heat inhering in and produced by the organ itself. Fourth, it has been said that not only the primary qualities but also the non-basic tactile qualities, such as the hard/the soft, constitute the proper sensible object of touch. However, the perception of precisely these secondary qualities stands in opposition to the view that we perceive the quality of hardness inherent in our hands. Our hands do not become physically soft when touching soft sensibles<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> DA VII, 14, 2, 734-736. As regards the issue of «the limits of the body» and thus «the limits of the organ of touch» in early Jesuit second scholasticism, see Des CHENE, D., *Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of Soul*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 2000, 196-9.

<sup>10</sup> DA VII, 14, 4, 740-4.

<sup>11</sup> See DA VII, 13, 3, 722: «... prima conclusio: Gustus et tactus non sentiunt qualitates suis organis [inhaerentes], sed qualitates rerum afficientium ipsos»; see also DA 14, 6, 744-6.

<sup>12</sup> DA VII, 13, 4, 722-8.

Whatever one may think of these arguments, Suárez's crucial substantiation of the impossibility of the tactual perception of qualities inherent in the tactile organ is given by the following reasoning. The tangibles, like the sensibles of the other senses, generate twofold activity. While the first activity is natural or physical, the second one is spiritual or intentional. While in physical activity the tangibles produce an effect similar to their own quality, the heat warms up the hand, the cold cools it down, etc., in intentional activity the tangibles emit the sensible (tangible) species. Importantly, in the case of the sense of *tactus* these two activities are ordered as follows: Unlike the other senses<sup>13</sup>, taste and touch cannot be affected purely intentionally. An intentional affection by tangible objects always presupposes a physical or natural alteration. Why is that so? It is due to the peculiar character of touch. Comparatively to the three «higher» external senses, the sense of touch is the most imperfect and the least noble<sup>14</sup>. Consequently, in order to be reducible to its act, i.e., to be «hittable» by the tangibles, the organ of this sense must be materially modified *secundum excessum*. Only if the balance of the primary qualities of its organ becomes noticeably «deflected» can the tangible object be perceived at all<sup>15</sup>. This deflection, Suárez seems to be saying, can come only from an *external* sensible object. Only this external tangible is capable of bringing about such an excess. Thus tactual perception seems to be only exteroceptual.

## 2. PAIN AS AN ACT OF THE APPETITIVE POWER

This exclusion, or, to be more charitable to Suárez, this non-inclusion of corporeal pain in the total proper sensible of touch seems to result in the conclusion that, properly speaking, bodily pain is not an object of the sense of touch but an *act* of the sensory concupiscible appetitive power. Accordingly, the affection of *dolor* is not significantly dissimilar to the passion of distress (*tristia*). In order to explicate what this statement actually amounts to, I have to outline the relevant aspects of Suárez's theory of emotions<sup>16</sup>.

Like the mainstream scholastic tradition, Suárez distinguishes between two main kinds of appetite, namely the sensory appetite and the rational appetite. These two faculties are not only really distinct from each other but they also differ *realiter* from the other (sc., cognitive) powers and from the soul. In the case of the «elicited» appetites, which – contrary to the so-called

<sup>13</sup> For that cf. *DA VII*, 3, 3, p. 590 (visual species); *DA VII*, 8, 7, p. 670 (auditive species); *DA VII*, 11, 4, 704 (olfactory species).

<sup>14</sup> See *DA VII*, 16, 2, 764ff.

<sup>15</sup> *DA VII*, 13, 6, 730-2.

<sup>16</sup> For Suárez's theory of emotions see KING, P., «Late Scholastic Theories of the Passions. Controversies in the Thomist Tradition», in: LAGERLUND, H., YRJÖNSSUURI, MIKKO (eds.), *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, Kluwer Academic Publisher, Dordrecht, 2002, 229-258, especially 238-244.

natural appetitive powers – are triggered by a preceding cognition, the two appetites differ in the character of the antecedent cognitive element. While the rational appetite, the will, starts from intellectual cognition, the sensory appetite follows sensory cognition. Both kinds of cognition bring along the necessary evaluative judgment that concerns the convenience/inconvenience of a perceived object conceived *sub ratione* of the good, or of the evil, which then elicits the affective elements of pleasure, or displeasure<sup>17</sup>. Importantly, in many places of *DA* 10 and 11, Suárez seems to suggest that the sensory appetite follows only the cognition of the *interior* sense power, and not the apprehension of the external senses<sup>18</sup>. Since for Suárez there is only one internal sense, i.e., the phantasy that generates all the various kinds of operations<sup>19</sup>, which Aquinas had ascribed to the really distinct interior senses including *vis aestimativa* or *vis cogitativa*, there is also one sensory appetite accomplishing the various kinds of affective operations, i.e., the concupiscible and the irascible ones<sup>20</sup>. The manifold of these acts is structured both by means of the nature of the appetible objects and by the manner in which these appetitive acts are related to their objects<sup>21</sup>.

According to the well-known taxonomy of emotions advocated by Aquinas, which Suárez also endorsed, though only for pragmatic reasons<sup>22</sup>, there are two main kinds of objects, namely the sensible good and the sensible evil. Speaking only about the concupiscible acts, the good and the evil can be approached in a threefold way. The sensible good can be followed, the sensible evil can be avoided either i) as the good/the evil in an unqualified sense (absolutely, i.e., without any temporal index), ii) as the good/the evil *qua* present, iii) or as the good/the evil *qua* future. The timeline of the past is irrelevant since as such it does not contain the feature of the good and the evil. The good that is vitally and absolutely followed by an appetent is equivalent to the emotion of love (*amor*), the evil being vitally avoided by the appetitive power amounts to the passion of hate (*odium*). While on the level of affective acts love is a temporally unqualified movement – called *pondus* by Suárez – of the soul toward a beloved

<sup>17</sup> *DA* X, 1, 3, pp. 286-90 (tomo 3, Madrid 1991). The adequate object of an appetite is the good, in the case of the sensory appetite it is the sensible good. See *DA* X, 2, 3, p. 292ff., and *DA* XI, 1, 4, 330.

<sup>18</sup> «... argumentum non esse sumendum ex sensibus exterioribus. Hi enim non movent appetitum immediate; sumendum ergo est ex interiori sensu», *DA* XI, 1, 2, 326.

<sup>19</sup> *DA* VIII, 1, 21, 40-4.

<sup>20</sup> For this reduction see HEIDER, D., «Aquinas on Sensitive Appetitive Powers and Suárez's Reductionism in *De anima*», in: ZORROZA, I. (ed.), *Las pasiones y las virtudes en la época de «El Greco»*, Cuadernos de pensamiento Español, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona 2016, 129-140.

<sup>21</sup> *DA* XI, 1, 6, 330-2.

<sup>22</sup> For this see FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, *Opera omnia*, Tomus quartus, *Tractatus de actibus qui vocatur passiones*, disp. 11, sectio 11, 475. See also KNUUTTILA, S., «Emotions from Plato to the Renaissance», in: KNUUTTILA, S., SIHVOLA, J. (eds.), *Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Psychology from Plato to Kant*, Springer, Dordrecht 2014, 492.

thing (person), hate is the inverse movement of avoidance of an odious thing (person). While the *pondus* of the passion of desire (*desiderium*) is related to a future good, the emotion of avoidance (*fuga*) concerns the evasion of an oncoming evil. While the affection of joy (*delectatio*) applies to an acquired good, the affect of distress (*tristia*) relates to a present evil<sup>23</sup>.

At first sight it is clear that a present evil vitally avoided by the sensory appetite is not only an «intentional» distress or sadness, but also a crude bodily pain. Considering Suárez's aforesaid non-inclusion of pain in the proper sensible object of touch, jointly with his statement that only the interior sense, i.e., the phantasy, proposes the object to the appetite, these two statements lead to the overall conclusion that, formally speaking, corporeal pain is an operation of the sensory appetite. Considering his theory of the sympathy or harmony of cognitive and appetitive powers, Suárez stresses that an appetitive act, strictly speaking, is not caused but only conditioned by the precedent cognition of the interior sense<sup>24</sup>. As elsewhere<sup>25</sup>, Suárez rejects causal efficacy between the cognitive objects (or acts) and the operations of the really distinct affective power. His claims that the organic root (*radix*) of sensory cognition is the heart and the principle of sense cognition is the brain<sup>26</sup> do not pose obstacles to this mediation. Suárez makes clear that if in respect to the elicitation of an affective act an apprehended object does not generate proper causal efficacy but only so-called metaphorical efficacy – the cognitive power only applies an object to the appetitive potency –, the two powers need not be located next to each other. It is the soul that «a-causally» mediates their contact<sup>27</sup>.

Concluding, in harmony with *DA VII*, 13, Suárez thinks that *dolor*, like *tristia*, is to be ranked among the concupiscible passions<sup>28</sup>. Bodily pain is necessarily perceived under the characteristic of a present evil. However, as said, the evil *qua* present is an object of the sensory appetite. Accordingly, pain is a passion or an emotion, the main characteristic of which is active bitterness (*amaritudo*) and active avoidance of the evil object<sup>29</sup>. As such corporeal pain forms a «conceptual tandem» with the emotion of distress, and consequently it stands in contrary opposition to the affection of pleasure or delight (*voluptas*).

<sup>23</sup> *DA XI*, 2, 2, 336.

<sup>24</sup> For this see *DA X*, 3, 6, 306-8.

<sup>25</sup> For a still valuable book on this *topos*, see LUDWIG, J., *Das akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suárez*, Karl Ludwig Verlag, München 1929.

<sup>26</sup> As regards the organ of sensory appetite, see *DA XI*, 1, 7, 332; for the organic principle of sense perception see *DA VI*, 6, 528-544.

<sup>27</sup> For metaphorical efficacy see *DA X*, 3, 8, 310.

<sup>28</sup> When presenting this view Suárez refers to AQUINAS's *Summa theologiae* 1.2, q. 35, a. 1 co. (see footnote 3).

<sup>29</sup> *DA XI*, 2, 5, 340.

### 3. DOLOR AND QUALITAS DOLORIFERA

Having placed *dolor* in the set of the concupiscible passions, a position compatible with Suárez's *DA VII*, 13, the main question to be raised now concerns the cause of this emotion. The answer to this question will determine not only the response to the issue by which cognitive power this cause is apprehended but, more importantly, also the answer to the first query of this paper, namely whether pain is really an emotion, or a sensible object perceivable by the sense of touch.

In *DA XI*, 2, 5, Suárez points out that despite the affinity of the passions of distress and pain, the two emotions are not identical. He explains that while *tristitia* concerns a present evil, which does not harm the body or the organ of touch, bodily pain applies to a present evil that does harm to the body and touch. In line with our experience it seems evident that we suffer corporeal pain in the very part of the body that hurts. Following the early Aquinas of the *Commentary on the Sentences* – in this text the Angelic Doctor's position seems to take the different position from the stance advocated in *Summa theologiae* 1, 2<sup>30</sup> – Suárez says that the cause of *dolor* is perceived by the sense of touch<sup>31</sup>. However, admitting this type of apprehension does not imply that Suárez supplements the cognition of the external sense of touch with some (corresponding) particular sensory appetite. According to this view which states that each external sense is paired with the corresponding sensory appetite – a theory defended several decades after Suárez's *DA* by the Spanish Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1641) – *dolor* is not an act of the *common* sensory appetite but of a *particular* appetitive power, namely the tactile one, which is preceded by tactile perception<sup>32</sup>. Suárez does not seem to show much understanding for this theory, as it unnecessarily multiplies the sensory appetites. Two appetites, the common sensory appetite and the rational appetite, sc. the will, suffice.

However, the following difficulty arises: In the *Topics* Aristotle, clearly *the* authority for Suárez, explicitly claims that the cause of pain amounts to «a

<sup>30</sup> «Secundo quantum ad perceptionem: quae quidem in dolore semper est secundum sensum tactus, ut dictum est, in tristitia autem secundum apprehensivam interiorem. Tertio quantum ad ordinem istorum duorum: quia dolor incipit in laesione, et terminatur in perceptione sensus, ibi enim completur ratio doloris; sed ratio tristitiae incipit in apprehensione, et terminatur in affectione; unde dolor est in sensu sicut in subjecto, sed tristitia in appetitu». THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Scriptum super Sententiis*, liber III a distinctione XIII and distinctionem XVI, 3, d. 15, q. 2, art. 3, qc. 2 co., <http://www.corpusthomicum.org/snp3013.html> (accessed 15 December 2016).

<sup>31</sup> «Experientia enim videtur docere esse in ipso membro, nam ibi sentiatur dolor», *DA XI*, 2, 5, 340.

<sup>32</sup> «Opinor diversis sensibus externis diversos respondere appetitus... bonum apprehensum est obiectum appetitus: sed bonum visum, auditum, etc. est bonum apprehensum, ergo est obiectum alicuius appetitus: sed non appetitus communis, ergo particularis». Pedro HURTADO DE MENDOZA, *Universa philosophia*, nova editio, L. Prost, Lugduni 1624, *De anima*, Disp. XVII, sect. XI: Utrum sint alii appetitus praeter internam?, 685.

separation of conjoined parts accompanied by violence»<sup>33</sup>. Accordingly, *dolor* is nothing else than the separation or dissolution of a conjoined whole. In his reply, Suárez, referring to Averroes<sup>34</sup>, rejects this view. He explicitly denies that the disruption of naturally conjoined parts is the *proximate* cause of pain. The main reason is that the disjoined parts cannot be regarded as a proper sensible object of touch since they are common sensibles, rather than proper sensibles. As such they can be perceived by more than one external sense, namely by sight and touch. At most it may be said that cutting and the resulting plurality of parts can be regarded as one of the *remote* causes of the emotion of pain. The proximate cause, however, must be some other quality produced by this scission or by another remote cause such as calefaction or commotion. In a gradual elimination Suárez then presents a second view (advocated by Averroes), according to which this proximate cause of corporeal pain is an «intemperies» of the bodily primary qualities, i.e., a lack of temperateness caused by an excess of some of the primary qualities. Such an excess of the hot or an excess of the cold in the body violating the overall equilibrium of the *humores* of the primary qualities is to be regarded as the proximate cause of pain. With reference to our experience Suárez says that we often perceive pain without recognizing whether the pain comes from an excess of the hot or from a superfluity of the cold. So it cannot be said that the *intemperies* caused by such an excess is the proximate cause, which as a proper sensible is apprehended by the sense of touch<sup>35</sup>.

In his positive account, in *DA XI*, 2, 7 Suárez states that the hot, the cold, a scission, or a commotion cannot be regarded as the proximate cause of pain. In fact, the proximate cause is the cause Suárez is at present searching for. The immediate cause of pain is the quality that results from the lack of temperateness in the primary qualities. So the lack of moderateness can at most be conceived as a middle link in the causal chain of the remote and proximate causes. It is a part of our experience that our hand hurts even more long after it has been removed from the fire and when it has already been cooled down in cold water. The same holds also for an injury caused by cutting. Sometimes a pain caused by cutting arises long after the act of scission has been terminated. As for the role of an excess in a primary quality as a middle link, it may be said that a scission causes a humor, which brings about an excess in one of the primary qualities, from which a new quality arises. And precisely this new quality is the secondary quality for which Suárez is searching. As such it is

<sup>33</sup> ARISTOTLE, *Posterior analytics, Topica*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England 1960, *Topica* VI, 145b13-4, 603: «For the separation of the conjoined parts is not pain, but a cause of pain...».

<sup>34</sup> AVERROES, *Colliget libri VII. Cantica item Avicennae cum eiusdem Averrois commentariis*, editio Juntina prima, Venice 1552, lib. 3, cap. 31, p. 26: «Et solutio continuitatis non est causa doloris... sed solutio continuitatis est causa complexionis, quae facit dolorem... anima sensibilis non est nisi ad qualitates... superfluitas contrariorum est causa doloris, qui fit in sensu...».

<sup>35</sup> *DA XI*, 2, 6, 342-4.

based on the first qualities<sup>36</sup>. Since in his *DGC* Suárez says that secondary qualities are innumerable (*innumerae*)<sup>37</sup>, it may be surmised that there is no *a priori* obstacle to including this new dolorogenic quality in the list of the proper sensibles of touch together with the other secondary qualities. There is no textual obstacle to including this quality in the total proper sensible of touch. Furthermore, including this quality is not an infraction of the theory of the specific unicity of touch advocated by Suárez. As the Jesuit emphasizes, assuming a single pair of contrary qualities is not necessary to get one external sense<sup>38</sup>.

Concluding, Suárez shows that, formally speaking, *dolor* amounts to an act of the sensory appetite. In his *De angelis*, book VIII, chapter XIII «Utrum ignis per solam apprehensionem, vel intentionalem actionem, aut per realem etiam effectiorem daemones torqueat», in perfect harmony with *DA XI*, 2, he rejects the theory according to which pain as such lies primarily in the cognitive power, i.e., that pain as such is perceived by the sense of touch. The damage of the flesh and the perception of *qualitas dolorifera* are only the first two steps concurring in the production of the experience of pain. Suárez explains that this experience is nothing else than «dissensio animae a tali laesione», which amounts to escape and dissatisfaction, viz. operations whose subject is the sensory appetite<sup>39</sup>.

#### 4. FRANCISCO DE OVIEDO (1602-1651) AND SUÁREZ

Why did Suárez not include the dolorogenic quality in the list of the proper sensibles of touch, if in *DA XI*, 2 this quality is introduced as its proper sensible object? With reference to *DGC* 4, 1 where the innumerable character of

<sup>36</sup> *DA XI*, 2, 7, 346: «Huiusmodi autem qualitas est qualitas secunda, quae provenit ex tali temperamento primarum, et est per se potens immutare tactum et violentiam inferre et dolorem».

<sup>37</sup> SUÁREZ, *In libros Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione*, disp. IV, q. 1, 25.

<sup>38</sup> For Suárez's arguments for the specific unicity of the sense of touch, even though there are more contrary opposites as far as its proper sensible is concerned, see *DA VII*, 16, 5, 756-8. See also HEIDER, D., «Suárez on the Lower External Senses», *Filosofický časopis*, Special issue: Explorations in Late Scholasticism, 2016, 81-102, especially 99-100.

<sup>39</sup> «[...] dolorem formaliter esse actum cognoscendi, falsum est, ut in tractatu de Anima inferius ostendam, et tradit div. Thomas, 1, 2, quast. 35; nec Augustinus supra dixit, sed agens de dolore sensibili ait, *Doloris, qui dicitur carnis, animae esse in carne, et ex carne* [...] Tria ergo secundum Augustinum, et veritatem concurrunt ad sensibilem dolorem, scilicet laesio carnis, perceptio laesionis, et dissensio animi a tali laesione, quae dissensio non est actus cognoscendi, sed est fuga quaedam, et displicentia appetitus; et in hac consistit formalis actu doloris, laesio autem carnis, eique disconveniens per doloriferam qualitatem est obiectum doloris: perceptio autem, seu cognitio laesionis est applicatio, seu propositio obiecti doloriferi», SUÁREZ, F., *Opera omnia*, tomus secundus, L. Vives, Paris 1856, *De angelis*, lib. 8, cap. 13, n. 9, 1025.

secondary (tactile) qualities is mentioned, it may be said that in *DA VII* Suárez only left the issue of the integrity of the proper sensible of touch aside. On the other hand, considering his proverbial «conciliatorism», I cannot help thinking that at times Suárez's reasoning borders on incoherence. He is well aware that the proximate cause of *dolor*, as an instance of a quality *inherent* in the body<sup>40</sup>, is not regarded as a proper sensible object by the Aristotelian tradition. At the same time Suárez is no less aware of the view familiar in the medical tradition, namely that pain is a quality directly perceived by touch. Throughout *DA* this tradition, represented by the names of Claudius Galen, Andreas Vesalius and Francisco Vallés, constitutes an important referential point for him, alongside the broad Aristotelian tradition<sup>41</sup>. It is not difficult to see Suárez's doctrinal wavering if we compare the two abovementioned «textual blocks» in *DA VII* and in *DA XI*. While in *DA VII*, 13 – where the issue of the proper sensible of touch is *ex professo* treated – Suárez does not refer to the *qualitas dolorifera* and explicitly denies that qualities inherent to the body can be perceived by the tactile power; in *DA XI*, 2, this quality seems to extend the «catalogue» of the proper sensible objects from *DA VII*, 13.

That these two formulations can be interpreted uncharitably can be seen clearly if they are compared with the «analogue» in Francisco de Oviedo, a post-Suarezian Jesuit. Unlike Suárez, Oviedo in the *De anima* part of his *Cursus philosophicus* (1640) explicitly includes the «dolorogenic quality», as well as the contrary «quality incurring pleasure» (*qualitas voluptuosa*), in the list of the total proper sensible of touch. Oviedo says that «Obiectum tactus, sunt quatuor primae qualitates, asperitas, suavitas, durities, & mollities. Addo qualitatem doloriferam & voluptuosam, quae tanguntur in sensatione, qua consistit dolor & voluptas externa sensus tactus»<sup>42</sup>. His inclusion of the dolorogenic quality and the quality incurring pleasure is substantiated by two

<sup>40</sup> That Suárez seemed to have considered the dolorogenic quality as an inherent quality can be substantiated by the other *passus* of his *De angelis*: «[...] sicut in dolore sensibili qualitas dolorifera est *in carne*, licet cognitio ejus fit in cogitativa, v. g. & fuga eiusdem sit in appetitu» [italics; D.H.]. Several years after Suárez's *De anima*, the Italian Jesuit Francisco Albertini (1552-1619), in connection with *qualitas dolorifera*, explicitly mentions the word «inherent»: «[...] qualitatem corpoream praesentem, & realiter inhaerentem in sensu tactus, quae causatur in corpore per actionem ignis, ex divisione continui, vel per distemperamentum naturalium qualitatum, & haec qualitas dici solet dolorifera, quia est obiectum doloris. Haec igitur prius percipitur a sensu tactus sive per se ipsam, sive per speciem immissam ab ipsa, quam qualitatem refugit in primis appetitus sensitivus», FRANCESCO ALBERTINI, *Corollariorum Theologicorum ex praecipuis principis complexis philosophicis*, Tomus primus, Ex Typographia Tarquinii Longi, Neapoli 1606, 417-8.

<sup>41</sup> Francisco Vallés (1524-1592) is quoted more than thirty times in Suárez's *De anima*. For this see Salvador CASTELLOTE, «Antropología filosófica en la obra de Francisco de Vallés Covarrubias»: *Archivo Iberoamericano de Historia de la Medicina y Antropología Médica* 15, 1963, 77-120, 78.

<sup>42</sup> FRANCISCO DE OVIEDO, *Cursus philosophiae*, BORDE, L., ARNAUD, L., BORDE, P., BARBIER, G. (eds.), Lugduni 1663, *De anima*, Controversia IV: De potentiis materialibus tam externis, quam internis, Punctum primum, § IV. De gustu, et tactu, 51, § 20.

claims, which Suárez had rejected. Typically, Oviedo explicitly ascribes these claims to Suárez<sup>43</sup>. First, by «elevating» the sense of touch to the position of the «higher senses» like sight, Oviedo asserts: «Ut obiectum tactus immutet subjectum intentionaliter, non est necessum ut possit idem realiter immutare per productionem similis qualitatis» [italics; D.H.]<sup>44</sup>. Unlike Suárez, Oviedo thus seems to admit the possibility that touch can be intentionally affected by the tangible without being affected by a similar real quality originating from the tangible. From this Oviedo infers his (for us relevant) second conclusion: «Tactus sentit calorem, seu aliam qualitatem excedentem intensionem illam, quam exigit organum tactus ad sui temperaturam, sive hic calor sit in alio subiecto, sive sit in eodem organo tactus» [italics; D.H.]<sup>45</sup>. Unlike Suárez, Oviedo explicitly concedes the possibility of tactile perception of qualities inherent in the organ of touch. This is admitted since, as the previous claim states, a natural alteration coming from external tangibles by virtue of a similar quality is not necessary. Distinctively, Oviedo, like, for example, Peter John Olivi before him<sup>46</sup>, in this case refers to a burning fever (*febris ardens*), of which we are bodily aware. Symptomatically, Suárez not only rejected the abovementioned conclusions, he also did not mention the phenomenon or even the term «febris» even once throughout his *DA*<sup>47</sup>.

## 5. ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND SUÁREZ

Leaving aside the issue of the (in)compatibility of Suárez's various formulations, it must be said that if his view from *DA XI*, 2 were transposed to the context of the contemporary analytic debate, his view would epitomize a tenable position, which still has advocates today.

<sup>43</sup> «Suarez ibidem docet tactum non sentire qualitatem receptam in ipso organo, posse tamen sentire calorem partis immediate unitae. Secundo docet tactum tantum sentire qualitates exasperantes, v.g. manum calidam ut quatuor non sentire calorem ut quatuor alius subiecti, sed alium intensiorem: ait enim has qualitates tantum posse subiectum intentionaliter mutare quando possunt realiter agere in illud, cum vero calidum ut quatuor in calidum ut quatuor non producat calorem, ita neque species impressas caloris, neque sensationem eiusdem», *ibidem*, 51, § 22.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*, 51, § 24.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibidem*, 51, § 25.

<sup>46</sup> «... multa per tactum apprehenduntur quae non minus differant quam obiecta diversorum sensuum, utpote, grave et leve, calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, durum et molle, densum et subtile, et item multiplex dispositio et indispositio proprii organi et totius corporis; nam gravedines indigestionum et inflationum et apostemationum et calores febriles... ac dolores et delectationes ex his causatas videmur sensu tactus sentire...», Petr. John OLIVI, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, 574.

<sup>47</sup> For this non-occurrence see Salvador Castellote's textual analysis of his three-volume critical edition of SUÁREZ'S *De anima Commentary* (Analysis textualis trium voluminum De anima). For this useful textual instrument see <http://catedraldevalencia.es/castellote/investigacion.htm> (accessed 15 December 2016)

As indicated above, there are two main opposing approaches to the issue of the nature of pain in contemporary analytic philosophy, both taken into account here. According to the first view, which can be called the perceptualist tenet, pain is regarded as an attribute of a physical object. We usually say «My thumb hurts», «I feel the pain in my left knee», etc. We commonly identify the pain with some kind of tissue damage. Tissue damage or, to put it more technically, the hurting activity in the nociceptors involves its own «sensory individuation» in the form of size, intensity, character, duration, etc. Moreover, we not only identify and classify the various bodily pains. We also re-identify and compare them. We assert «The stubbing pain I had in my left knee yesterday is already here» or «Today the obtuse pain I have in my elbow is more intensive than the one I had yesterday». Such classification and (re)identification does not seem to differ significantly from our visual experience of a red colour and its tracing. Although most representatives of the perceptualist view do not conceive pain as a direct object of perception but rather as a concomitant feature of the perceptual act of tissue damage – George Pitcher states «[...] that to feel pain, or to have a pain, is to engage in a form of sense perception, that when a person has a pain, he is perceiving something» or «[...] to feel a pain is to be (directly) aware of a perfectly objective state of affairs»<sup>48</sup> – sense perception comprises for them all the phenomenological content of what it means to be in pain. Clearly, this view highlights the perceptual, representational, descriptive and informative aspects in our experience of pain. On the other hand, there is also the different and no less strong intuition, which leads in the opposite direction. Our feeling of pain cannot be identified with the sensation of something physical in the part(s) of our body. As empirical evidence shows, it is not difficult to think of cases in which the perception of some injury and the feeling of pain are, so to say, reactively disassociated. As instances of phantom limb pain or hysteric pain show, it is often the case that people feel a pain although their body is not damaged, or that they think they feel a pain, say, in a limb that has been amputated. Moreover, the advocates of this «subjectivist» view claim that pain cannot be identified with the tissue damage of some part of our body since our body or its part can be physically damaged and yet by taking an analgesic we can find ourselves in a state in which we feel no pain at all. We do not register pain in the same way as we notice the red colour of an extramental object. When we are in pain we are much more focused on the experience itself rather than on the object of the experience. Contrary to the exteroceptual experience, the interoceptual experience of pain and other inherent states makes us much more focused on the experience than on the object<sup>49</sup>. Accordingly, it seems that the feeling of pain is the model case of a subjective, private and incorrigible experience. Moreover, only this concept

<sup>48</sup> PITCHER, G., «Pain Perception», *The Philosophical Review*, 79, 1970, 368-393, 368.

<sup>49</sup> For this argument against perceptualist theories of pain see AYDEDE, M., «Pain», *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 4.2: «The Problem of Focus».

of pain can accommodate the phenomenological richness of our experience of pain<sup>50</sup>. Typically, its descriptive content is often much smaller than that of any exteroceptual perception. However, more than this kind of perception, the experience of pain involves «qualia», which are often associated with the functional aspects of the subject of pain. These functional elements are connected with the affective, emotional, evaluative, motivational and imperative elements, which can be expressed by sentences such as «Pain is horrible!» or «Pain is to be avoided!».

Unlike the pain research practiced in psychiatry, psychology and neuroscience, the mainstream philosophical approach retains the objective element within the pain experience<sup>51</sup>. According to Murat Aydede, who can be regarded as one of the advocates of the so-called «mixed view of pain», i.e., the view combining elements of both attitudes mentioned above, this objective aspect is not all that pain is about. The descriptive and representational parts of pain constitute only a preliminary step in the pain experience. Although Aydede agrees that pain can be classified as «a submodality of touch», in one breath he adds that pain does not amount only to a representational state, but also to a functional state<sup>52</sup>. In its essential lines, precisely this mixed view of pain was formulated and advocated by Suárez as well. On the one hand, Suárez states that pain experience has its own object, its own cause, which can be perceived as the dolorogenic quality by the tactile power with all its nociceptors. This perception is what secures the conveyance of the informative components usually associated with pain. On the other hand, it is the interior sense, the phantasy, that evaluates the localizable dolorogenic object as a corporeal evil and proposes it to the sensory appetite, which then «motivates» the bearer of pain to avoid this evil. This emotional act of discontent, which is essentially «objectual» – all emotions are triggered only by a previous cognition – cannot lose its object from its «viewing field». However, comparing it to tactile perception, this operation of the sensory appetite is more focused on «itself». Since this object is proposed to the sensory appetite by the phantasy, the modern examples of phantom limb pain or hysteric pain can be accommodated in his theory as well. Notoriously, the phantasy, unlike the external senses, does not perceive only the sensibles *hic et nunc*, but it can perceive them also in their *absentia*. Moreover, the human imagination with its creative potential can, especially in hypochondriac and hysteric people, even feign the existence of dolorogenic qualities. It can

<sup>50</sup> For this argument see HARDCASTLE, «Perception of Pain», 533-4.

<sup>51</sup> This pain research leads philosophers to eliminate what is ordinarily known as the phenomenon of pain. Daniel DENNETT, e.g., based his arguments on what he calls the «reactive dissociation» of the pain affect from its sensory aspect. For his eliminativism of our ordinary concept of pain see DENNETT, D., «Why You Can't Make a Computer that Feels Pain», in: DENNETT, D. C. (ed.), *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology*, Massachusetts: MIT Press, Cambridge 1981, 190-232.

<sup>52</sup> For MURAT'S «mixed view of pain» see «Pain», esp. 5 «Evaluative and motivational theories» and 7 «Conclusion».

evoke a pain without any real corporeal counterpart<sup>53</sup>. Also, since the phantasy has its corporeal seat in the brain, it is not far-fetched to assert that Suárez's mixed view can even accommodate the reactive disassociation of those who have applied pain-killers and do not feel any pain, even though their tissue is damaged. Clearly, analgesic pills can affect both the brain and the sensory nerves leading from the sensorium to the brain in such a way that the subject will feel no pain. Applied to the scholastic context, it may be said that pain is not felt since the animal spirits (*spiritus animales*), which constitute the necessary physiological condition of any perception, cannot pass through from the sensoria of the external senses to the organ of the internal sense<sup>54</sup>.

Universidad del Sur de Bohemia,  
České Budějovice, (República Checa)  
Daniel.Heider@seznam.cz

DANIEL HEIDER

[Artículo aprobado para publicación en enero de 2018]

---

<sup>53</sup> For the unique interior sense in SUÁREZ, its scope and functions see *DA VIII*, 1, 14-46.

<sup>54</sup> For the function of *spiritus animales* in SUÁREZ see *DA VI*, 6, 10-11, 540-2.